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COMMENTARIES
RDoCs redux
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We are delighted to share in the de-
bate about the RDoC program, as we
feel some responsibility for its birth. In-
deed, the notion articulated in RDoC to
inform “future versions of psychiatric
nosologies based upon neuroscience
and behavioral science rather than
descriptive phenomenology”, by pro-
viding “a framework for conducting
research in terms of fundamental cir-
cuit-based behavioral dimensions that
cut across traditional diagnostic cate-
gories” (1), is adirectoutgrowthof stud-
ies that began in the Clinical Brain Dis-
orders Branch of the Intramural Re-
search Program of the National Insti-
tute for Mental Health (NIMH) at St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital in the early 1980s.
This body of work led to the creation
of the Genes, Cognition and Psychosis
program, an interdisciplinary research
program which in its title recognized
that the biology of psychopathology
was not linked to diagnostic nomencla-
ture. The work of this program in iden-
tifying mechanisms in the brain by
which risk factors influenced biological
susceptibility was a foundation of the
Strategic Plan launched by the NIMH
in 2008 and in which the RDoC plan
was proffered.
Given our experience with work that
forms so much of the rationale for
RDoC, we should be enthusiastic. So,
why are we not?
Actually, the debate between “lump-
ers” and “splitters”, whether in the
realms of descriptive psychopathology
or in brain imaging measurements or in
genetics, has been going on literally for
over a century in psychiatry. The RDoC
project claims to be a new and enlight-
ened way to split and then lump, be-
cause it argues that the neuroscience
and genetics of psychiatric disorders
open new arenas for such progress.
This sounds really good, but to para-
phrase a popular beer advertisement
in the USA, does it taste great?
We see the main concerns about the
RDoC mindset not with its conceptual
foundations, but with its reliance on the
presumed validity of the behavioral,
neural functional and genetic dimen-
sions it highlights as fundamental to a
revision of psychiatric nomenclature.
Ultimately, any revision of psychiatric
diagnosis, which clearly is the RDoC
goal, must be better than the existing
system, better in the sense of what diag-
nosis is about. Diagnosis is primarily an
instrument used by clinicians for two
primarypurposes: topredict thenatural
history of an illness and to predict the
mostappropriate treatment.Thiswillbe
the standard also for RDoC, if its long-
term goal of replacing existing diagnos-
tic practices is to be realized.
Even clear and important dimen-
sions of behavior and its reward-based
underpinnings may have unexpected
complexities when viewed through the
RDoC lens. In an incisive and elegant
study, Gold et al (2) demonstrated that
negative symptoms in schizophrenia
are associated with overestimating the
cost (or effort) involved in attaining an
outcome.Onecouldeasilyviewthisasa
metric or dimension, suggestive of “de-
grees” of negative symptoms. One can
imagine elegant neuroimaging studies
of effort estimation showing varying
engagement of prefrontal, insular, and
striatal function.
Cuthbert’s suggestion that a good re-
search study would be to explore such
behavioral and neural system dimen-
sions across current diagnostic groups
and in subjects without psychiatric
diagnoses presents a daunting conun-
drum.Forexample, “overestimating the
cost (or effort) involved in attaining an
outcome” also seems to be a suitable
operational definition of laziness, as
used by lay individuals. Thus, an impor-
tant question is whether this or any of
the RDoC dimensions have the same
meaning when associated with schizo-
phrenia qua schizophrenia, or if they
are observed across other diagnoses
and in a spectrum of otherwise normal,
albeit, lazy individuals. Moreover,
would the neural systems and genomics
that are associated with this set of
behaviors be the same in all cases? Sev-
eral recent papers focus on this issue.
They suggest, for example, that mecha-
nisms for auditory hallucinations in
otherwise healthy functioning individ-
uals (so called “voice-hearers”) may be
different than the mechanisms associ-
ated with such symptoms in schizo-
phrenia (3).
It has become increasingly popular
to believe that similar patterns of brain
activity in patients with psychiatric ill-
ness and in some non-psychiatric re-
search samples underlie RDoC-type
dimensions of psychopathology. These
studies are based on specific protocols
that elicit physiological responses criti-
cally dependent on the context. It is an
old saying in the functional neuroimag-
ing research lexicon that functional
neuroimaging data reflect what the
brainwasdoingduring the imagingpro-
tocol, but the challenge for the investi-
gator is to figure out what the brain was
actually doing. The meaning of this say-
ing is that patterns of engagement of
brain functional systems during an
imaging experiment do not necessarily
reflect a specific or even definable brain
state. A clear illustration of this is the
current fascination with the so-called
resting state functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) experiment,
where subjects, including diverse sam-
ples of psychiatric patients, are allowed
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to lie in the confining and noisy envi-
ronment of the MRI scanner for five to
ten minutes doing nothing. This is said
to be a resting or unstimulated state and
the pattern of activity typically seen in
normalsubjectsafter theyhaveacclima-
tized to the scanner environment is
called the “default network”. Part of
the appeal of this paradigm is that it is
easy to do and easy to find differences
between patient and control samples.
Patients with a variety of psychiatric
diagnoses have been observed to have
deviations from the default pattern, and
it is often stated that they show a defi-
ciency or abnormality of the default
network as if this is some sort of neural
defect. Clearly, the relative engagement
or lack thereof of the default network is
a dimension putatively linked to a neu-
ral circuit. Do we imagine that patients
currently diagnosed with schizophre-
nia, or children with autism, or patients
with Alzheimer’s disease, all of whom
may show similar patterns of default
network deviations, share pathology in
this dimension? Sounds good, but does
it taste great? In fact, it is highly implau-
sible thatpatientswithschizophreniaor
with autism will experience the MRI
environment analogously to a paid
healthy volunteer and it is unlikely that
they will each experience it the same,
either. The different ways in which they
are liable to think and feel about the
noiseandtheconfinementwill interfere
with the so-called default system, pro-
ducing a potentially similar degree of
abnormality on this dimension, but
based on dissimilar reasons.
The current approach to caseness is
rooted in many decades of clinical ob-
servation and detailed description of
clinical course and natural history, and
many academic debates about how best
to represent clinical reality. This rich
history has also witnessed many self-
proclaimed enlightened movements to
change the scheme. In the absence of
pathognomonic findings, diagnosis is
imprecise and multidimensional, as it
is in other fields of medicine. The idea
that RDoC is a blueprint for research to
fill in this multidimensional landscape
is appealing and attractive. But, as an
approach to ultimately revise the con-
cept of caseness, it has a much more
difficult task.
One of the most important compo-
nents of any diagnostic scheme that is
conspicuously missing from the RDoC
phenomenology matrix is the dimen-
sion of time. The DSM-5 regards time
asan essential aspectofmostdiagnostic
categories. In neurology, it is said that
time is the best diagnostician. Good
psychiatric clinicians know that cross-
sectionalphenomenology isproblemat-
ic, and what looks like obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder today, may turn out to
bepsychosis tomorrow.What looks like
schizophreniaearlyoninthecourseofa
patient’s history turns out to be bipolar
disorder down the road. Were these
examples to have been treated based
on the RDoC dimensions, the outcome
might not be optimum, to say the least.
Indeed, asmuchas there isoverlap phe-
nomenologically and perhaps geneti-
cally in what we call schizophrenia
and what we call bipolar disorder, and
patients across these categories will
share many RDoC dimensions, it is
indisputable that for some patients
with the latter diagnosis, lithium is as
miraculous as any treatment in psychi-
atry, yet it is entirely without antipsy-
choticeffects inpatientswiththeformer
diagnosis.
There isgoodevidencethatdiagnosis
per se is a social construct and is depen-
dent on where on a continuum some
relatively arbitrary threshold a caseness
call gets made (4). The DSM system has
always recognized that having symp-
toms is not sufficient for a clinical diag-
nosis. There must also be disability. Ill-
ness and disability or functional com-
promise are inseparable concepts. Re-
gardless of the in vogue phenomenolo-
gy, illness begets disability. Even be-
tween mild cognitive impairment and
Alzheimer’s disease there is a grey area.
An unbiased way at looking at symp-
toms, cognition, etc., involving thresh-
old-free dimensions, has been thought
to be a valid alternative. However, this
fails to account for notable differences
at the severe ends of the spectrum that
may encompass multiple dimensions
and the possibility that “disease” neu-
robiology can accelerate.
It’s a nobrainer that psychiatric diag-
nosis is imperfect, subjective and not
basedonpathophysiologyorcausation,
and the field is eagerly anticipating a
future where this would be different.
Psychiatric practitioners are faced with
realworldpatientswithrealworldprob-
lems and their decisions are not readily
informed by rarefied fMRI paradigms
and weak genetic associations. They
use diagnosis to help them organize the
complex clinical landscape.
Most clinicians know that the diag-
noses they apply are approximations,
that they refer to syndromes not distinct
disease entities, and that they do not
express distinct boundaries. They un-
derstand that our diagnoses are con-
structs, and that patients do not have
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, per
se; they are given these diagnoses.
These realities seem to have surprised
researchers, many of whom unfortu-
nately know about psychiatric illnesses
only from what they read in the litera-
ture or on their computer screens.
Our current approach to psychiatric
diagnosis is the result of many decades
of deep clinical experienceandscholar-
lydebate.Asimperfectas it is, it isaprac-
tical and clinically useful tool that has
helped transform psychiatry from sub-
jective, impressionistic categorization
of clinical syndromes to more objective,
diagnostically reliable definitions. The
field would be dramatically enhanced
by a better system, as would many other
fields of medicine. But, the adoption of
an alternative phenomenology must be
viewed with caution and it must result
in something better than what we have.
This means more clinically valuable to
practitioners and to patients.
We suspect that RDoC will be liber-
ating to some researchers, because they
willbeencouragedtomovebeyondcur-
rent diagnosis in designing clinical re-
search projects. Does this require a ma-
jor NIMH initiative that co-opts the
grant review process and has the unin-
tended consequence of actually reduc-
ing creativity by its very mandate and
also of potentially undermining clinical
practice?Onemighthope that research-
ers and clinicians alike are continuing to
think outside the box and are exploring
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new ways of solving old problems with-
out the NIMH telling them that they are
not.
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Wittgenstein’s nightmare: why the RDoC grid needs a
conceptual dimension
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RDoC attempts to finesse an exis-
tential dilemma facing psychiatry: psy-
chiatry is most persuasively a medical
field if mental disorders are understood
as brain disorders, but brain disorders
seemtofallunderneurology.TheRDoC
attempts to resolve this dilemma by dis-
tinguishing brain circuit malfunctions
as the distinctive domain of psychiatry:
“the RDoC framework conceptualizes
mental illnessasbraindisorders; incon-
trast to neurological disorders with
identifiable lesions, mental disorders
can be addressed as disorders of brain
circuits” (1).RDoCfurther locatesbrain
circuit function within a grid of analyt-
ical and developmental levels and
dimensions that together are supposed
to replace DSM/ICD categories with
more valid diagnoses.
Wittgenstein famously said: “In psy-
chology there are experimental methods
and conceptual confusion. . . The exis-
tence of the experimental method
makes us think we have the means of
solving the problems that trouble us;
though problem and method pass one
another by” (2). RDoC is a paradigmatic
expression of Wittgenstein’s concerns. It
joins an ambitious empirical research
program with a conceptual framework
so weak that it is difficult to envision suc-
cess. I consider below some of the
RDoC’sapparentconceptualchallenges.
RDoC embraces brain-circuit con-
struct validity without addressing con-
ceptual validity, thus gets the relation-
shipwrongbetween itselfandtheDSM/
ICD. The RDoC sees the DSM/ICD’s
failures when it comes to construct
validity (i.e., each diagnosis identifying
one etiological category), but fails to
appreciate DSM/ICD’s essential role
in psychiatric legitimacy. The DSM/
ICD identifies conditions that, judging
from surface symptoms, context, and
background knowledge of normal hu-
man functioning, fall under the concept
of disorder. Correctly distinguishing
between disorder and normality is what
Ihave labeled conceptualvalidity.Con-
ceptual validity is independent of con-
struct validity: a DSM/ICD disorder
category can encompass ten different
disorders and thus lack construct valid-
ity,butbeconceptuallyvalid if itencom-
passes only disorders, and it can becon-
struct valid but identify a non-disorder
and thus be conceptually invalid. Most
criticisms of DSM-5 were accusations
of conceptual invalidity, that criteria
encompassed normal variations. What-
ever its errors, DSM/ICD remains an
attempt to delineate the domain of psy-
chologicalconditions that fallunder the
concept of disorder. RDoC offers noth-
ing to replace the DSM/ICD efforts to
delineate the domain of disorders and
provide a target at which construct val-
idation can aim. DSM/ICD provides
the only thoughtful guidance to what
conditions the RDoC must explain in
terms of malfunctioning circuits.
RDoC pays inadequate attention to
context. RDoC’s grid includes environ-
mental influences, but by this RDoC
means environmental risk factors like
early traumas or disturbed attachment
relations that influence the trajectory of
disorder development. Nowhere in the
RDoC grid is there adequate recogni-
tion that human psychological mecha-
nisms are biologically designed to res-
pond sensitively to the social and en-
vironmental context. No diagnostic
scheme can be valid without building
ample contextual references into diag-
nostic criteria, as does the DSM (3).
RDoC is confused about which of
two meanings of “etiology” is pertinent
to disorder diagnosis. Ultimately, etiol-
ogy individuates disorders. This is why,
whenmultipleetiologiesare discovered
in formerly unified diagnostic entities,
they divide into several disorders, as in
recent developments regarding breast
cancer. But, what is an etiology? In the
context of mental disorder, “etiology” is
ambiguous, having a broader and nar-
rower meaning (4). In the broad sense,
“etiology” refers to the causal story by
which a disorder comes about. Such
causal histories can encompass any-
thing that led to the disorder, including
risk factors, environmental events,
common genetic variations, and other
factors that are not in themselves disor-
dered but were part of the pathway that
led to the disorder. As indicated in its
grid, RDoC studies the entire develop-
mental trajectory that leads to disorder,
adopting what I call a “kitchen sink”
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